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Abstract:   
Research on the effects of positional concerns on individuals’ attitudes and behavior is sorely lacking. 
To address this deficiency, we use the International Social Survey Programme 1998 data on 25’000 
individuals from 26 countries to investigate the impact of relative income position on three facets of 
social capital, covering horizontal and vertical trust as well as norm compliance. Testing relative 
deprivation theory, we identify a deleterious positional income effect for persons below the reference 
income, particularly for their social trust and confidence in secular institutions. Also often a social 
capital-lowering effect of relative income advantage occurs, while a rise in absolute income almost 
always contributes positively. These results indicate that a rise in income inequality in society too 
large is rather detrimental to the formation of social capital.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Concern about relative position is a “deep-rooted and ineradicable element in human nature” 
(Frank 1999, p. 145), the social repercussions of which have long preoccupied human secular 
self-reflection and contemplation.1 In economic theory, Adam Smith (1759/1976), like his 
successors Karl Marx (1849) and Thorstein Veblen (1899), emphasized the importance of 
relative position and social concerns. Modern economists such as Arthur Pigou (1920), John 
Maynard Keynes (1930), James Duesenberry (1949) and Harvey Leibenstein (1950) have 
since elaborated on these ideas, incorporating them into their own analyses. In contrast to the 
position of traditional standard utility theory, (which advances the notion that individuals 
evaluate their welfare only in absolute terms), the theory of positional concerns assumes that 
individual welfare depends on comparisons with others. It is therefore surprising that many 
economists have largely neglected this aspect.  
In particular, there is a dearth of empirical research into the impact of relative income 
position on individual attitudes and behavior (see Senik, 2004). Moreover, of the existing 
studies on the effect of relative income position, most focus on its association with happiness 
rather than its impact on social capital (e.g., Clark and Oswald, 1996; Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 
2005; Luttmer, 2005; Dorn et al., 2007; Senik, 2004, 2008). The first attempt at analyzing 
relative income effects presented the results for 4 measures of social capital only (Fischer and 
Torgler, 2006a). The current paper extends on that previous work, including three broad 
facets of social capital (horizontal trust, vertical trust and social norm compliance) and 
employing a more sophisticated methodology.2  
The question of the determinants of social capital, in particular its income-related 
determinants, has recently come to the attention of economists. Not since long have 
economists ‘discovered’ social capital – widely studied and highly prominent in all social 
sciences – and found it to be of importance for economic phenomena like macroeconomic 
  3 
performance. For example, arguing with its private transaction-cost lowering nature, Knack 
and Keefer (1997), in a cross-sectional analysis, find a strong and significantly positive 
relationship between social capital variables and economic growth. Schaltegger and Torgler 
(2007) use a synthetic panel of Swiss cantons (1981–2001) and show that trust in government 
enhances fiscal performance. Regarding public finance, Slemrod (1998) argues that social 
capital – measured as the willingness to pay taxes voluntarily – lowers the costs of 
government operations and of equitably assigning such costs to citizens. Such research 
justifies a closer look at what shapes social capital.  
To remedy the void in the research on relative income effects for social capital, this 
paper contributes to the recent discussion in two important aspects: first, by employing 
different measures of social capital we aim not only to produce detailed evidence on the 
impact of positional concerns on social capital formation, but also to reflect three different 
dimensions of social capital: generalized trust (horizontal trust), confidence in institutions 
(vertical trust), and compliance with social norms, In addition, our study overcomes some 
methodological shortcomings by using survey data from the 1998 wave (RELIGION II) of the 
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), which covers approximately 25'000 persons 
in 26 countries. Moreover, in line with some previous studies, we include a comprehensive set 
of control variables to better isolate partial correlations between relative income position and 
social capital (see Appendix Table A1).  
In developing the theoretical point of view, we are going to formulate our hypotheses 
based on the relative deprivation theory. Clark and Oswald (1996) point out that “the lack of 
empirical evidence, except of what most economists view as of a circumstantial nature, has 
kept relative deprivation theory on the periphery of research in economics” (p. 360). 
However, we are aware that it is possible to explore alternative theories such as ambition, 
hope, tolerance or gratification (see, e.g., Senik 2004, 2008).  
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II develops the theoretical 
approach and predictions. Section III describes the dataset, and Section IV presents the empirical 
results. Section V concludes the paper. 
 
 
II. THE EFFECT OF RELATIVE INCOME POSITION ON SOCIAL 
CAPITAL 
 
1. The Role of Relative Income Position in Society. 
In real life, it appears commonplace for individuals to make relative judgments regarding their 
own positions (for an overview, see Frank and Sunstein, 2001). More specifically, people tend 
to compare themselves with others in their social environment and care a great deal about 
their relative position in society, which in turn may influence their attitudes and observable 
behaviour. In social science theory, social comparisons were historically thought to play a 
role in the interaction between people, as many economic and social phenomena might be 
explained by the interdependence of individuals’ utilities.  
Since Kant’s (1785/1964) early contribution on the importance of social comparisons, 
social psychology, sociology and anthropology have traditionally emphasized the 
fundamental significance of relative preferences to human motivation (see, e.g., Festinger, 
1954 for the theory of social comparison; Stouffer, 1949 for the theory of relative 
deprivation). In addition, a minority of economists have elaborated on the concept of 
interdependent preferences, whose inclusion in economic theory allows social comparisons3. 
However, as McAdams (1992) points out, although social scientists have at least challenged 
the concept of selfishness by assuming positively dependent preferences leading to empathy 
and altruism, they have nevertheless neglected the aspect of positional concerns: “Much less 
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has been said about the extent to which preferences are negatively interdependent, and the 
economic consequences of such preferences” (p. 3).  
 
2. Relative Deprivation, Envy and the Impact on Social Capital. 
Relative deprivation theory investigates interpersonal and inter-group relations and social 
comparisons. The theory stresses that a lower perception of one’s own (group) status or one’s 
own welfare in relation to another person (group) can be the source of hostility towards the 
other individuals or groups. A person may feel deprived and get frustrated when his/her 
situation (e.g., individual earnings) falls relative to the reference group. If improvement of the 
situation is slower than expected, the experience of frustration can even cause aggressive 
behavior (see, e.g., Walker and Pettgrew, 1984). The term relative deprivation is used to refer 
to the negative feelings that arise from having less than other people (López Turley, 2002).4  
Deprivation theory is strongly linked to the literature on envy and positional concerns. 
The German social scientist Helmut Schoeck (1966) amply demonstrates that positional 
concerns are a widespread social phenomenon engendering a myriad of everyday actions 
aimed at reducing relative deprivation. For example, school uniforms are thought to reduce 
possible envy among pupils. For the same reason, schoolteachers may ask parents to refrain 
from packing special treats in their children’s lunchboxes (Elster, 1991). An extreme example 
occurred in China during the Cultural Revolution when farmers owning fruit trees were 
ordered to cut them down (Zhang and Sang, 1987, cited in Elster, 1991). Thus, positional 
concerns may translate into envy and feelings of deprivation, when the individual’s current 
situation is below her own aspiration level. Several economists, primarily in 1970s literature 
on welfare economics, also discuss the significance of envy (e.g., Foley, 1967; Brennan, 
1973; Varian, 1974; Archibald and Donaldson, 1979; Mui 1995). More recently, experimental 
economists have discovered the relevance of incorporating positional concerns to explain 
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outcomes of ultimatum games in which participants have to agree on how to divide a ‘pie’ 
(see, e.g., Kirchsteiger, 1994; Frank and Sunstein, 2001.)  
 
3. Derivation of Hypotheses. 
Deprivation theory based on social comparison may help construct an argument as to how 
individual positional concerns may affect various dimensions of social capital. Indeed, López 
Turley (2002) has shown that relative deprivation may have negative effects not only on 
psychological well-being as well as on physical health, but also on pro-social behavior. In this 
paper, we conjecture that individuals’ contributions to social capital in their society may well 
be such an affected behavioral outcome. 
 
3.1. Social trust  
Turning to the first facet of social capital, we hypothesize that individuals’ positional 
concerns may affect her level of generalized trust – to what extent she trusts other people in 
general. Most particularly, disadvantages in the relative income position are linked with 
frustration (“it could have or should have been me”), unhappiness and resignation of not 
being able to ‘keep up with the Joneses’. Possibly, feelings of frustration might be caused by 
the impression of being economically exploited by those who are better off in society, 
particularly when individuals believe that the income distribution was the outcome of an 
unequal distribution of power between economic agents rather than the result of market forces 
under perfect competition. Bjørnskov et al. (2010) reveal empirically for a world sample that 
income inequality in society is more easily borne when people’s perception of a fair society 
coincides with the degree of actual social mobility, which is not the case in the reverse case of 
a mismatch between expectations and reality, leading to disappointment effects. Fischer 
(2008) shows that market competition is social trust-increasing for those with an income 
above the median level, but exerts no effect on those with a low income. Thus, in other words, 
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feelings of exploitation and deprivation might arise if societal wealth was unequally 
distributed among its producers in an unfair manner. As a consequence, such feelings of 
relative deprivation may lead not only to distrust of the Joneses (i.e., the reference group) but 
also of other citizens, which reduces generalized trust. Based on these thoughts, we can 
develop the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1:  
Positional concerns decrease people’s trust in others, i.e., feelings of relative 
deprivation may lead not only to distrust of the Joneses (reference group) but also 
other citizens, reducing people's generalized trust.  
 
3.2. Vertical trust 
In addition, relative deprivation may also lead to the experience of discontent toward the 
structure of a society (Canache, 1996). More specifically, individuals may blame the state or 
its institutions for generating an unfair distribution of the societal wealth pie and, 
consequently, the relative income disadvantage they experience compared to the Joneses. 
Thus, frustration and feelings of exploitation may lead not only to a decrease in trust at the 
horizontal level (generalized trust) but also at the vertical level; that is, the relation between 
the individual and her government or other institutions that govern society. The degree to 
which these social institutions are held responsible by individuals for their current social 
position may depend on the perceived degree to which these institutions influence societal 
outcomes and, implicitly, shape individuals' choice set. For example, the national parliament 
is linked to the current politico-economic level, while the courts and the legal system are 
linked to the constitutional level. Owing to stronger long-term effects (blaming the ‘rules of 
the game’), we may expect a stronger impact of positional concerns on confidence in 
institutions at the constitutional level. On the other hand, short-term and unexpected policy 
changes are more prominent among the law-making bodies, where previous decisions are 
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overruled faster and new governments occur more often. The influence of these institutions at 
the current politico-economic level might be particularly strong given that people have 
adjusted their aspiration levels to the long-term determinants of their social position. Thus, we 
are not able to make an a priori statement for which type of government institution positional 
concerns should be more pronounced. 
Moreover, because positional concerns are widely present in the workplace (see, e.g., 
Elster, 1991; Frank and Sunstein, 2001), we may also see an impact on individuals’ 
confidence in the environment of business and industry in which they are involved daily. In 
other words, individuals may blame the economic sector for their relative income 
disadvantage, which could lead to a decreased level of trust in that social sector. On the other 
hand, vertical trust increases if individuals have an advantage in relative income. This leads to 
the next hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: 
The disadvantageous relative income position is detrimental to individuals’ trust in 
secular institutions such as the courts, parliament and business and industry. 
 
3.3. Norm compliance 
Sociological research has observed a causal link between relative deprivation and social 
protest, and illegal activities such as violent crime, property crime, and drug use (Canache, 
1996; Stiles, Liu, and Kaplan, 2000). Negative self-feelings, frustration and aggression that 
are induced through feelings of deprivation motivate individuals to restore self-esteem 
through illegal activities - there is evidence that financial dissatisfaction lowers the level of 
tax morale (Torgler, 2006). Based on survey data for 30 European countries, Frey and Torgler 
(2007) reveal that taxpayers act upon their beliefs about the compliance behavior of other 
taxpayers. Thus, interpersonal comparisons may also have an impact on individual’s 
willingness to pay taxes (tax morale). We conclude that a relative income disadvantage may 
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create distress over the discrepancy between the actual and the aspired-to financial situation, 
lowering sense of civic duty of tax honesty. In such a scenario, the socially and economically 
deprived may choose means for an ‘illegal’ and retaliating income redistribution, by cheating 
the government not only by not paying taxes, but also by claiming unjustified government 
benefits.5  
Benefit morale and tax morale as civic duties are expressions of the quality of the 
relation between the citizen and her government that acts as tax-collecting and income 
redistributing agency. The civic duty of norm compliance, however, does also exist in the 
sphere of criminal law, where the government prosecutes and punishes infringements of other 
citizens. The successful prosecution of such criminals is not possible without citizens’ 
cooperation through e.g. serving as truthful witnesses. However, as we argued above, 
frustration and social grievances may well result in own illegal activities or the protection of 
friends’ criminal activities. Consequently, we expect the disadvantage in relative income 
position to negatively affect social capital also in its dimension of general law compliance as 
form of cooperation with the government. Thus, we can also formulate the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: 
Relative income concerns are deleterious to individuals’ willingness to obey the law 
and comply with social and legal norms.  
 
3.4. Confidence in religious institutions 
However, even though differences in income may lead to positional concerns, there may be 
instances in which the creation of social capital is not negatively affected. For example, 
religious institutions provide moral constitutions for a society and as a type of ‘supernatural 
police’ that re-enforces compliance with socially accepted rules (Anderson and Tollison, 
1992). Equally, it encourages the production of social goods such as moral behavior rooted in, 
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for example, the Ten Commandments (Hull and Bold, 1994). More specifically, in the interest 
of social peace, religions control and restrain positional concerns not only by potentially 
building up hope and tolerance (see below), but more so through a sanctioning system that 
reinforces social values, providing support for toleration of inequality and legitimizing 
noticeable differences in individual socio-economic position. Fundamentally, all world 
religions teach the avoidance of envy; for example, according to Jewish tradition, causing 
others to feel ashamed and creating envy through one’s own behavior is unlawful. Similarly, 
in the Qur’an, Mohammed describes envy as a sickness and the “shearer of religion”. 
Buddhism regards envy as one of the so-called five poisons that may lead to continuous re-
birth and must therefore be overcome. In Hinduism, the avoidance of envy is a yama, an 
advised restraint, which should be followed. Regarding Christianity, Schoeck (1966) points 
out that “in the West, the historical achievement of this Christian ethic is to have encouraged 
and protected […] the exercise of human creative powers through the control of envy” (pp. 
159-160). Thus, we can therefore expect that positional concerns may not affect people’s trust 
in churches and religious organizations because these institutions provide mechanisms for 
cauterizing the feeling of envy. These observations lead to the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 4: 
Trust in churches and religious organizations should not be affected by relative 
income concerns.  
 
   
III. DATA  
 
This analysis uses a cross-section of individual data from the 1998 ISSP survey, which 
contains various questions about individual 'contributions' to the formation of (aggregate) 
social capital related to three dimensions – trust between people, people’s trust in social 
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institutions, and compliance with norms. The ISSP survey is a program of cross-national 
collaboration on representative surveys covering a wide range of topics for social science 
research; it covers approximately 25’000 individuals from 26 countries. As the survey is 
conducted in several countries, comparative data on values and belief systems among people 
of different cultural backgrounds can be investigated – a facet we exploit in our empirical 
robustness test. Inclusion of a large number of countries in a multivariate cross-national 
analysis allows us to observe culturally and socially independent tendencies. Instead, previous 
available literature based on individual-level data has only investigated only one type of 
social capital in one single country (Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005).  
 The notion of social capital employed in this study encompasses multiple aspects. In 
this paper, based on the classical definition of social capital by Putnam 1993, p.167, we 
distinguish its multiple facets along three different dimensions: trust between people 
(horizontal trust/social trust), confidence in secular and religious institutions (vertical trust), 
and compliance with social norms.6 However both trust among people, and the people’s trust 
in national institutions are often viewed as two facets of one dimension (see, e.g., Glaeser et 
al., 2000; Knack, 2000; Uslaner, 2002).  
The first dimension of social capital, generalized trust - the belief that “most people” 
can be trusted - does not depend on trusting “specific groups” (see, e.g., Fischer, 2008); thus, 
it is generalized trust, not particularized trust. In line with the literature, we measure 
generalized trust using the following question: “Generally speaking, would you say that 
people can be trusted or that you cannot be too careful in dealing with people?”. Whereas 
generalized trust reflects the horizontal relation between citizens, trust in (state) institutions is 
a key factor in measuring the vertical interaction between citizens and the state or other 
organizations. Thus, in a further step, we also include four questions that relate to the second 
dimension of social capital – such as “How much confidence do you have in institution X?” – 
to test several facets of vertical trust. The secular institutions to be analyzed are the 
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parliament, the courts and legal system, businesses and industries (the economic sector); other 
societal institutions include the church and religious organizations. 
 The third dimension of social capital - compliance with social norms - is measured 
using questions related to tax morale, government benefit morale and compliance with legal 
norms. Because traditional economic models of tax evasion predict far too much 
infringement, tax honesty seemingly depends on numerous factors that go beyond standard 
economic concepts like deterrence. To resolve this conundrum, many researchers suggest that 
the intrinsic motivation for individuals to pay taxes – termed in the literature as ‘tax morale’ – 
helps explain these high levels of tax compliance (for an overview, see Torgler, 2007). In line 
with previous empirical research we assess individual's level of tax morale using the 
following question: “Do you feel it is wrong or not wrong if a taxpayer does not report all of 
his or her income in order to pay less income tax?” The benefit morale (see e.g. Halla and 
Schneider, 2005), the acceptance of the practice of claiming government benefits without 
being entitled to them, is investigated in a similar manner. Compliance with legal norms like 
criminal and traffic laws is measured by the following moral dilemma: “Suppose you were 
riding in a car driven by a close friend. You know he is going too fast. He hits a pedestrian. 
He asks you to tell the police that he was obeying the speed limit.” Thus, our social and legal 
norm compliance measures are proxies for different ethical questions and civic duties in daily 
life.  
All eight categorical social capital variables have been recoded so that higher values 
correspond to higher levels of individuals' social capital (i.e. individual contributions to the 
amount of social capital in society). It is important to our analysis to note that this dataset 
provides precise information on personal income measured continuously in monetary units, 
on which we base our relative deprivation variables. Moreover, this data set allows us to 
control for a wide array of additional socio-demographic factors usually employed in 
multivariate analyses of well-being issues such as tax morale or life satisfaction (see, e.g., 
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Fischer and Sousa-Poza, 2008; Torgler, 2007). To ensure disposable income is comparable 
across persons, equivalent income is calculated based on the modified OECD equivalence 
scale (Van Doorslaer and Masseria, 2004).7 The benchmark income, measured by the national 
median income, is computed as the median of the personal equivalence income observed in 
one country. Using the median income of the reference group seems intuitively appealing for 
investigating social comparison effects, particularly in countries in which the income 
distribution is strongly skewed.8 Income distances are calculated as the difference between an 
individual’s (equivalent) income and the reference group (equivalent) income. Cross-country 
comparability of relative income is then achieved by dividing these income distances by their 
country-specific median incomes, expressing relative income in terms of share of the median 
income (see also Section IV).9 
Descriptive statistics for these variables are reported in Tables A1 and A2 of the 
Appendix. Taking a look at (absolute) income differences, means and standard deviations are 
smaller for incomes below the national median than for those above. The descriptive statistics 
in Table A1 also show that there are as many men as women in our sample, and reports that 
individuals below 50 years and married persons form the majority groups in our sample. 
Moreover, although the average educational level is quite high, a strong variation is observed. 
Regarding denominations, most interviewees are either Protestants, Catholics, or are not part 
of a particular religious denomination. In our sample, more interviewees live in urban areas, 
and the majority is either employed, or, to a lesser extent, retired.10  
 
IV. MODEL AND METHODOLOGY 
 
To operationalize the theoretical part for empirical research it is necessary to define an 
appropriate proxy for social comparisons, our focal predictor of the emergence of social 
capital. As economists, we recognize the central role of individual’s income in determining 
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one’s social position in relation to her peers, as it is income that constitutes the financial 
constraint on an individual’s consumption possibilities. Although appealing as a theoretical 
construct, an individual’s aspiration income is not directly observable in this survey. 
However, following the approach taken by recent empirical happiness research, we believe 
that aspiration income can be approximated by employing the concept of observable reference 
income that we define as the median income of the reference group (e.g. Dorn et al, 2008; 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; Clark and Oswald, 1996)11. In other words, we believe that the 
measure ‘relative income distances’ allows investigation into the implications of relative 
income position on social capital. Any relative income position can be either of an 
advantageous type, namely a position beyond the reference income, or of a disadvantageous 
type, leading to so-called positional concerns.  
 In this cross-sectional model (which is simplified here), we regard the individual i’s 
self-reported contribution to social capital in country s (Yis) as a function of the relative 
income position of that individual in country s (Zis) and a vector of additional individual 
control variables (Vis) that also includes absolute income. National fixed effects (Fs) and an 
error term (εis) complete this model.  
 
  Yis = β1Zis + β2Vis + Fs + εis             (1) 
 
Our variable of interest, relative income position (Zis), is measured as the difference between 
an individual’s (equivalent) income and the reference group (equivalent) income, defined as 
the median income in each country sample, standardized across countries by dividing through 
the median income.  
In order to separate the effect of relative income from that of the absolute income, 
vector Vis also includes a measure of absolute income.12 Following previous empirical 
research on the effect of relative income for happiness as in Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005), we 
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assume decreasing marginal utility of absolute income, which we express using the log-form, 
in line with the known behavioral economics literature (e.g. Clark and Oswald, 1996). 
Inclusion of a squared term allows for some flexibility with respect to the functional relation 
between the social capital variable and absolute income. In the case of absolute income, cross-
country comparability is ensured by taking the log, with the country fixed effects then picking 
up international differences in purchasing power. Notably, absolute income serves only as a 
necessary controlling variable and therefore the magnitude of its effect is only of little 
interest.  
The total and partial correlations between the absolute income measures and the 
relative income measures are so low that we can exclude the possibility that relative income 
just picks up an absolute income effect, or that a statistical identification of their separate 
effects was not possible total (partial) correlation between absolute income and 
negative/positive income distance are -0.18 and 0.03 (-0.08 and 0.005), respectively).13  
To ensure comparability of the estimation results, computation for the various 
dimensions of social capital employs the identical set of control variables at the individual 
level (Vis). This vector of control variables (Vis) is based on previous empirical literature on 
life satisfaction or social capital (e.g., Dorn et al., 2007; Torgler, 2007). It includes gender, 
age, education, occupational status, marital status, religious denominations, religiosity, and a 
dummy for living in an urbanized area. Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix provide a 
complete list of the dependent variables and the determinants. 
Important, but often neglected, control variables at the aggregate level are the 
country’s cultural background, norms and institutions as well as its overall economic 
situation, that might be correlated with individual-level characteristics, (particularly income 
situation), and equally influence the creation of social capital. The effects of these national 
characteristics are not directly counted for in the model, but are captured by country fixed 
effects (Fs), which also ‘absorb’ the reference group’s income level.  
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Given the categorical nature of our dependent variable, equation (1) is estimated with 
a weighted ordered probit estimation method; application of weights makes the estimation 
results representative for the corresponding national population.14 In addition, because the 
estimated coefficient only indicates the direction of an effect and not its magnitude, we also 
compute (total) marginal effects for reporting the highest level of social capital. For each 
regression outcome we report the McFadden R2 that ranges between 0 and 1.15 
It can be argued that interpersonal income comparisons are asymmetric (Duesenberry, 
1949; Holländer, 2001; Frank, 1985), explicitly modeled in, e.g., Fehr and Schmidt (1999). 
Methodologically, the possibility of an asymmetric effect is taken into account through 
differentiating between the impact for ‘poorer’ persons and the influence for ‘richer’ persons, 
similarly to the approach taken by Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005, p.1004).16 Moreover, we might 
expect a decreasing marginal utility of income for richer, but not poorer, individuals, which 
we take into account by including the squared terms of the income differences. Thus, the 
vector Zis contains the following relative income variables: 
 ‘negative income distance’ = (ys – yis)/ ys, if yis < ys and 0 otherwise, 
 ‘positive income distance’-squared = ‘positive income distance’^2 
‘positive income distance’ = (yis – ys)/ ys if yis ≥ ys, and 0 otherwise, 
 ‘negative income distance’-squared = ‘negative income distance’^2.  
 
Econometrically, this model specification has the advantage that it assumes a more flexible 
functional form of the relation between relative income and social capital, in contrast to when 
one assumes a linear or log-linear form, as often encountered in happiness studies (e.g. Ferrer-
i-Carbonell, 2005). In this specification, the model allows for both a linear as well as a 
quadratic relation (in the first case, the coefficient on the quadratic term would simply appear 
as insignificant). High correlation between the relative income variable and its squared term 
(rho = 0.8 and higher), however, might disguise a truly decisive impact of any of them. Wald-
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tests of the joint significance of the income distance and its squared term aim to distinguish 
these cases from those where they exert, both individually and jointly, an insignificant 
impact.17 The test statistics are included in the bottom line of the output tables.   
Due to the cross-sectional nature of our data, reversed causality and measurement error 
might bias the estimated coefficients. In particular, social capital might influence an 
individual’s earnings and therefore potentially her relative income position. Knack and Keefer 
(1997), for example, provide evidence at the macro level that trust may affect growth. 
Moreover, other omitted factors might drive both professional career and the perception of 
social capital in society.18 However, happiness panel studies with individual fixed effects 
(controlling for unobserved individual heterogeneity) found only small effects of reversed 
causality (at least not affecting the direction of the positive income effect). Fischer (2008) 
reports in her cross-sectional study on generalized trust only negligibly small biases, using the 
richer World Values Survey dataset, which includes suitable instruments for income. As is the 
case in many other cross-sectional studies using individual data, the small ISSP data provides 
only little exogenous variables for an instrumental variables (IV) approach. However, the 
robustness section includes a description of estimation results that are based on IV estimates 
using regional fixed effects (and one individual characteristic) as instruments.   
Table A3 reports descriptive statistics for all eight social capital variables per country 
in the sample. At the micro-level, Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients show low 
correlations among the eight social capital measures, with only a few exceeding the value of 
0.4.19 This relatively low correlation among the social capital variables suggests that they 
measure distinct facets, justifying their separate analysis.   
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V. ESTIMATION RESULTS  
 
Tables 1 and 2 report the effects of individuals’ positive and negative income distances for 
our set of social capital measures, taking the national median income level as reference 
income. For reasons of comparison we also describe the estimates for the absolute income 
variables, the inclusion of which in the model ensures that relative and absolute income 
effects are identified separately. In an ordered probit model, the non-linearity of both positive 
and negative income distances, as well as that of absolute income, leaves simple marginal 
effects on squared terms without any economic meaning, disguising the direction of influence 
of the underlying variable. Accounting for the polynomial structure of the model with respect 
to all income variables, Tables 1 and 2 report their ‘total’ marginal effects calculated at the 
sample mean; for reasons of comparisons, we express them as elasticities.20 As each income 
variable is highly correlated with its squared term, we use Wald-tests to assess the joint 
significance of both coefficients. Overall, the Pseudo R² of about 0.06 indicates the model is a 
good fit to the data for all measures of social capital (except for the tax morale regressions). 
Table A4 of the Appendix displays the estimates and elasticities of the remaining 
variables in the model, exemplary for the generalized trust question, our most prominent 
measure of social capital. All included individual-level determinants are significant at the 1 or 
5 percent level, and if not individually, then jointly with covariates relating to the same 
background factor (e.g. denomination). The following discussion of Tables 1 and 2 puts 
emphasis on positional concerns (negative income distances), for which we derived our 
hypotheses in section 2 and which we conjecture to be overall detrimental to the formation of 
social capital in society. For reasons of comparison, we also discuss the effects of having a 
positional income advantage, the impact of which on social capital cannot be determined a 
priori (see discussion below). For judging the relative importance of the income distances we 
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assess their elasticities with respect to the absolute income effect, which exerts a social 
capital-increasing influence in almost all analyses.  
 
1. Generalized Trust 
Testing hypothesis 1, the relative income effects for our social capital measure ’generalized 
trust’ are presented in column 1 of Table 1. The dependent variable reflects respondents’ four 
possible answers to the question whether they believe that people in general can be trusted. A 
low value for the categorical regressand reflects the personal view that people cannot be 
trusted in general, and thus a low level of individual's generalized trust, and a small 
contribution to the amount of generalized trust in society (see also Table A1).21 This social 
capital measure is commonly employed in empirical analyses that investigate the economic 
effects of generalized trust in the population (see, e.g., Knack and Keefer, 1997).22 
The regression results for generalized trust are consistent with our hypothesis 1: the 
coefficient on the negative income distances is negative and significant at the 1 percent level. 
Thus, positional concerns are highly destructive for individual's generalized trust: as the 
distance between her own income to that of the reference group grows, so does her trust in 
people in general decline. The significant coefficient on the squared term indicates that the 
effect of positional concerns is non-linear. Gauging the relative importance of positional 
concerns for individuals’ generalized trust, the total elasticity (calculated at the sample mean) 
suggests that an increase in a positional disadvantage by 1 percent lowers the probability of 
expressing the highest level of social trust (forth category) by 3.45 percent. This effect is 
comparable in size to the elasticities of e.g. being in the age group of 50 to 60 years old 
(.045), of having a lower secondary education (-.03), or of attending religious services 
frequently (.029). For many of the covariates, however, the observed elasticities are smaller 
by far than those for the relative income effects. These include, for example, all predictors of 
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employment status, marital status and religious affiliation (see Table A4 of the Appendix). 
Thus, the effect of positional  concerns is of a considerable magnitude.  
For generalized trust, we also observe trust-lowering effects of a positive income 
distance to the reference income level (at the 5 percent level); this effect is also non-linear, as 
the Wald-test on the joint significance indicates. The total elasticity suggests that an increase 
in a positional income advantage by one percent triggers a decline in the likelihood of 
expressing the highest level of social trust by 3.3 percent. Obviously, the quantitative effects 
for positional concerns and positional advantages are quite comparable in size.  
Column 1 also shows that social trust rises in absolute income, non-linearily, with a 
total elasticity of 0.38. Comparing relative sizes of the effects of absolute and relative income, 
the impact of absolute income is about ten times larger than that of either relative income 
measure.  
Comparing the magnitude of the income effects for generalized trust, relative income 
positions of both poorer and richer people exert considerable social capital lowering effects, 
with similar quantitative effects. Both are, however, dominated by the impact of absolute 
income. Possibly, as income of an already advantaged person rises, the positive effect of the 
rise in absolute income may outweigh the negative one by her improvement in her relative 
income position, leading to an overall positive effect of income growth on her level of social 
trust. For a disadvantaged person, however, a further decline in her income yields an overall 
trust-lowering impact that is a compound effect of the worsening of both her relative and  
absolute income positions.  
In sum, our first analysis shows a social trust-lowering effect of a negative income 
distance which is in support of our hypothesis 1. Compared to the impact exerted by other 
socio-demographic covariates, the effect is of considerable size and an important economic 
factor of individual attitude. We also detect further a social capital destroying impact of a 
positive income distance – a finding that needs some further discussion. That a positional 
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advantage may destroy social capital is in line with another strand of deprivation theory which 
claims that positional advantages could create mixed feelings: fears of societal punishment 
and retaliation by others’ driven by their envy. In consequence, individuals with positional 
advantages then start to distrust in others (e.g., Elster, 1991; Alesina et al., 2004).23 In sum, 
these findings do support our hypothesis 1 that positional concerns lead to lower social capital 
in terms of individual's level of generalized trust. That is, the more concerned people are with 
their relative (disadvantageous) income position, the less they regard their environment as 
trustworthy.  
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 1 about here  
---------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
2. Trust in Institutions. 
2.1. Rule-setters for the economic sphere 
The second set of social capital measures relates to vertical trust – that represents the quality 
of the relationship between institutions and respondent. Columns 2 through 4 of Table 1 
provide the results for the relative income effects for individuals’ confidence in those 
institutions which fix the rules of the game in society and set the environment for economic 
and social participation. In particular, we test hypothesis 2 by investigating into people’s trust 
in parliament, courts, and the business sector.24 Again, higher values for these variables 
indicate higher levels of individual vertical trust. 
For all three types of rule-setting institutions do we observe a strong non-linear 
positional concern-effect which is social capital-destroying (at least at the 5 percent 
significance level). This finding is consistent with hypothesis 2: Respondents are less likely to 
report the highest level of confidence in the national parliament, the courts, or the business 
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sector, the more their own income lies below the reference income. Comparing total 
elasticities for negative income distances, the effects are most sizable for confidence in 
parliament and courts as compared to the one for confidence in the business sector (-.045 and 
-.05 versus -.009). With an absolute total elasticity less than 0.01 this latter form of vertical 
trust appears almost irresponsive to positional concerns. The large negative income distance 
effects for confidence in the parliament and courts is consistent with our conjecture that 
positional concern effects are larger for rule-setting institutions: obviously, people hold only 
legislating institutions which determine the fairness of the income generation process and 
their economic opportunities responsible for their misery. As alternative explanation for the 
small relative income effect for trust in the economic sector, as most countries in the sample 
are institutionally and economically quite well developed, persons not too far below the 
sample mean (the middle class) may form expectations of upward social mobility taking place 
in the economic sector which they expect to realize soon. That expectations of an upward 
social mobility mitigate negative effects of income inequality has been suggested by Alesina 
et al. (2004) and Bjørnskov et al. (2010). 
As for generalized trust, we also observe social capital-destroying effect of positional 
income advantages. The Wald-tests of joint significance indicate that for all three institutions 
people’s confidence in them is lowered as their advantageous relative income position 
increases. For trust in the two rule-setting institutions courts and parliament, the relative 
income advantage exerts effects that are smaller (in absolute size) than those of a 
disadvantage (parliament: -.026 versus -.045; courts: -.018 versus -.054). Again, as for 
generalized trust we suspect that persons with a positional advantage fear retaliation and envy 
by others which overcompensates an (otherwise) positive effect of having an advantage. The 
opposite is observable for trust in the business sector: here the advantageous relative income 
effect outweighs that of the positional concerns (-.028 versus -.009). We have argued before 
that the small impact of positional concerns for those at the sample mean may be due to 
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expected upward social mobility; thus, for those with a relative income advantage, we suspect 
that they view themselves as having to defend their current social status.  
As already observed for horizontal trust, again, individuals’ confidence in all three 
institutions rises strongly with absolute income. Gauging the relative importance of the socio-
economic position measures, the total elasticities suggest that the trust-increasing effect of 
absolute income is about 5 times larger than that of positional effects.    
Overall, consistent with hypothesis 2 we find in Table 1 that  positional concerns are 
deleterious for trust in secular institutions: those not able to keep up with the Joneses appear 
to attribute the responsibility for their socio-economic position to the parliament and the 
courts that set the institutional framework of economic and social activity. While some 
positional concern effects are also observable for confidence in the business sector and the 
economy, we speculate that their smaller importance by far may be caused by expectations of 
upward social mobility in that sector.  
 
2.2. Religious organizations 
Our hypothesis 4 states that positional concerns should not play a role for confidence in 
religious organizations and churches as all major religions teach the avoidance of envy. 
Column 1 of Table 2 tests whether absolute and relative income position effects matter for 
individuals’ confidence in this institution.  
The results for confidence in ‘churches’ and other religious organizations are in line 
with our expectations: such form of vertical trust appears unaffected by people’s positional 
concerns or advantages. This is indicated by the insignificances of the single coefficient 
estimates and the Wald tests on the income distance variables. Notably, in contrast to our 
previous dimensions of social capital, we do not detect any effect of absolute income either.  
In sum, we conclude that there is neither a relative nor an absolute income effect for 
the confidence in church and religious organizations. This finding is in line with hypothesis 4, 
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and possibly reflecting the (presumably) non-profit and morality-enforcing nature of these 
institutions.  
 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Table 2 about here 
--------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
3. Compliance with Social Norms 
3.1. Civic duty as honest tax payer 
Table 2 relates to the third dimension of social capital, i.e. compliance with legal and social 
norms. We measure the adherence to being a ‘good’ tax payer with two indicators: so-called 
‘tax morale’ and ‘government benefit morale’. The ‘tax morale’ measure relates to the 
respondent’s view on whether it is morally wrong to report income taxes incorrectly, which is 
an attitude measure of one’s own (de facto) voluntary tax payment.25 The lowest category   
reflects then a low level of social capital; the highest category indicates the answer “seriously 
wrong”. This section also discusses the related concept of ‘benefit morale’, namely whether it 
is morally wrong to give incorrect information in order to obtain government benefits26. The 
hypothesis that positional disadvantages affect norm compliance negatively (hypothesis 3) is 
then tested for ‘being an honest tax payer and benefit claimer’ in columns 6 and 7 of Table 2. 
The most important result is that negative income distances do not show any statically 
significant association with the social capital-facet ‘being a good tax payer’: both tax morale 
and government benefit morale are not affected by positional concerns. A further deterioration 
of individual's relative income position has no effect on her probability to report the highest 
category of norm compliance. Obviously, the frustration generated by the discrepancy 
between one’s own income and the aspired-to level is not sufficiently large to induce a break 
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in social norms. Possibly, as already argued for trust in the economy, a government 
guaranteeing some upward mobility and future improvements in one’s financial situation may 
mitigate current disappointment and frustration effects of the disadvantaged - as the recent 
world-wide country comparison by Bjørnskov et al. (2010) suggests.  
Similarly, income advantages do not affect people’s willingness to pay taxes, as the Wald-
tests indicate; – the opposite is observable for benefit morale: here the estimation results for 
positive income distances suggests that persons with relative income advantages are more 
likely to reveal an attitude of cheating the government. As observed before for horizontal and 
vertical trust, social capital also declines in positional advantages. We have to admit that we 
lack a convincing explanation for the asymmetry between tax morale and benefit morale – 
possibly, people judge tax evasion as more immoral than cheating the government for 
subsidies and benefits, as the financial sources of government transfers are often disguised.27   
For absolute income, we observe a strong positive effect (at least jointly significant at the 
5 percent level), suggesting that both tax morale and benefit morale increase as individuals 
become better off. This finding is in line with previous empirical analyses of tax morale that, 
however, do not separate relative from absolute income effects (see Torgler, 2007). The total 
elasticity suggests that the probability of reporting in the highest benefit-morale category 
increases by 7.1 percent when absolute income increases by 1 percent; as observed for 
generalized trust and confidence in institutions, the absolute income effect is multiple times 
larger than the impact of relative income.   
Overall, we can conclude that hypothesis 3 is not supported for tax morale and benefit 
morale: positional concerns appear to play no role for people’s willingness to be a ‘good 
citizen and honest taxpayer’: the economically relatively deprived do not appear to view 
‘illegal’ redistributive activities through cheating the government as justified. This finding is 
interpreted in analogy to the negligible positional effect on trust in the business and the 
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economy, which we explain with expectations of upward mobility that mitigates frustrations 
of being positional disadvantaged.   
 
3.2. Civic duty of being a truthful witness 
Another facet of the third dimension of social capital ‘norm compliance’ relates to the civic 
duty of ‘being a truthful witness’, a form of cooperation with the government when it comes 
to legal norm enforcement. In column 8 of Table 2, we employ the question whether one 
attributes a friend the ‘right’ to one’s own unlawful testimony in order to protect her against 
state prosecution. This social capital measure is constructed in analogy to the tax-payer-
morale questions: it asks whether close friends have the right to you giving wrongful 
testimony aimed at preventing or lowering their punishment – answering in the lowest 
category reflects a low level of social capital contribution.28   
Interestingly, in contrast to ‘being a good taxpayer’, obeisance to the criminal law by 
truthfully witnessing is quite strongly affected by positional concerns, as hypothesis 3 
predicts: as the distance of one’s own income from the (higher) reference income grows does 
one’s willingness to comply with the law decline (as the Wald-test on both negative income 
distance variables suggests). The total elasticity of -.007 suggests, however, a rather small 
quantitative effect, compared to those observed for other measures of social capital  
Analogous to the observations on tax morale compliance, positional advantages do not 
affect norm compliance. Contrasting expectations, the estimates for the absolute income 
variables suggest that the willingness to protect a friend’s illegal activities against state 
prosecution increases with absolute income.   
Overall, the estimation results for legal norm compliance are consistent with 
hypothesis 3: they suggest that social deprivation, the clash between aspired-to income and 
actual income, lowers people's sense for civic duty and causes them to cover up a friend’s 
norm infringements to prevent her prosecution – the deprived cease cooperation with the 
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government which they may accuse of being responsible for their personal situation. Thus, 
our findings of the deleterious effects of positional concerns for ‘being a good witness’ in 
support of hypothesis 3. 
 
4. Summary and Robustness of Results 
4.1. Summary 
Table 3 provides a concise overview of the findings of our individual-level analysis of the 
effect of relative income on social capital formation, reducing the information on the direction 
of influence and its statistical significance – empty cells indicate that no significant impacts 
were observable. In sum, we find convincing evidence for the presence of positional concern 
effects for two of the three dimensions of social capital, namely for generalized trust and 
confidence in secular societal institutions: having a relative income disadvantage lowers 
peoples' level of social capital and, implicitly, their contribution to aggregate social capital. 
This finding persists even when we control for their absolute income. This finding is in line 
with previous analyses of relative income effects for e.g. happiness that rely on household 
panels that also account for unobserved heterogeneity (e.g. Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005). While 
social capital-lowering positional concern-effects are also detected for the civic duty ‘being a 
good witness’, for the remaining norm compliance measures of ‘being a good tax payer’ no 
such influence is present. We explained small positional concern effects for tax and benefit 
morale, but also for trust in the economy, with people's expectations of an upward social 
mobility in the economic sphere (e.g. Bjørnskov et al., 2010). Trust in churches and religious 
institutions is equally not affected by positional concerns, as we had already expected for this 
higher morale-enforcing institution. 
Common to almost all analyses is that individual's level of social capital increases in 
her absolute individual income. This holds true for all three dimensions of social capital 
(generalized trust, vertical trust, and norm compliance). The sole two exceptions are, on the 
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one hand, ‘confidence in churches’, which is formed irrespective of people’s income 
situation, and, on the other, ‘giving a truthful testimony’, as the willingness of doing so 
declines in personal income.  
We also observe destructive effects of a positive income distance to the reference 
income. We explain this finding by the fear of the relatively advantaged from envy, retaliation 
and criminal activities by the economically relatively deprived; Alesina et al. (2004) use a 
similar explanation for the heterogeneous effects of income inequality on residents’ happiness 
between the US and European countries. The strongest effects for such social capital lowering 
impact of a relative income advantage is observable for two of the three dimensions of social 
capital, namely for generalized trust, confidence in parliament and confidence in business and 
the economy; they are weak but present for benefit morale.  
 Judged by their overall elasticities, deleterious effects of positional concerns almost 
always outweigh the effects of a relative positional advantage (see also Table A5 for three 
different absolute income percentiles). When significant, the elasticity of the positional 
concern effects is roughly at -.04. Compared to the size of the elasticities of many other socio-
demographic covariates, the impact exerted by income distance is considerable (see Table 
A4). Even though positional concerns are relevant factors for individuals’ contributions to 
social capital in the country they live in, they are always outweighed by the impact of 
absolute income, with an elasticity of about 5 times as large as that of positional concerns. 
----------------------------------------- 
Table 3 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
 
4.2. Robustness of Results 
Discussing the robustness of our results, one may argue that the inclusion of absolute income 
confounds the associations between relative income and social capital. However, as described 
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in the data and methodology section, total and partial correlations among the income variables 
are so low that this is not likely to be the case. In addition, we present in the bottom row of 
Table 3 the observable (significant) direction of influence of absolute income when estimating 
a model that omits the relative income variables. For seven of the eight models, the previously 
observed relations between absolute income and the social capital variables prevail, 
suggesting that social capital rises in absolute income (except for confidence in churches 
which decreases in absolute income).  
In addition, one may argue that social capital variables are not comparable across 
culturally diverse countries. However, the ISSP is explicitly designed to yield internationally 
comparable results. Arguably, individuals’ differences in reporting behavior may still 
confound the empirical findings. However, as explained in the methodology section, the 
inclusion of country fixed effects mitigates such bias.  
One may also argue that social comparison effects are not identical across all 26 
countries in our analysis; thus, our findings for absolute income and negative income 
distances may be sensitive to the composition of the country sample. We have addressed this 
concern using two approaches: first, as the small number of individuals per country, often 
below 1000, does not allow analyzing these effects per country separately, we have run the 
identical analysis with one specific country excluded at one point in time, yielding no decisive 
changes. Second, we have added to the empirical model interaction terms of the three income 
variables with country fixed effect in our empirical model; a (joint) significance of these 
interactions (according to Wald-tests for each income variable and its squared term separately, 
e.g., test (yis * Fs , y2is * Fs) = 0) would then suggest that the impact of the income measures is 
heterogeneous across countries and thus, culture- or macroeconomy-specific. However, not 
only are the single estimates on the interaction terms all insignificant through out, but also do 
the three Wald-tests on the joint significance not reject the null hypothesis.29 Overall, our 
empirical findings in this study appear to be of a general nature. 
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Similarly, issues of reversed causality have already been discussed in the methodology 
section. Based on the above-mentioned previous empirical studies on happiness and 
generalized trust, we have, however, strong reasons to believe that causality rather runs from 
income to social capital than the other way round. In addition, we have empirically tested this 
assumption by employing an IV estimator using region fixed effects and a dichotomous 
individual-level variable ('having supervisory power') as exogenous instruments for income. 
Table 4 reports the estimated coefficients of the (instrumented) relative income variables and 
summarizes the direction of influence – due to a weak instruments problem and a much 
smaller regression sample not all economically relevant factors show up as statistically 
significant. Arguably, application of standard IV to a categorical dependent variable with only 
a few categories may also bias the estimates. Thus, the following findings have to be taken 
with a grain of salt, and are possibly less reliable compared to those presented in Tables 1 to 
3. In comparison with Table 3 the important observation in Table 4 is the fact that in most 
models the positional concern effects prevail, as the negative coefficients on the negative 
income distance measure indicate, even though absolute income is also controlled for. 
----------------------------------------- 
Table 4 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
  
The importance of relative preferences is not a new concept in economics. However, 
empirical evidence on the extent to which relative income position matters in different aspects 
of life is relatively rare. Moreover, most empirical studies to date have focused mainly on the 
impact of relative income position on happiness (Dorn et al., 2007, 2008). Until now, there 
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have only been limited laboratory experiments dedicated to investigating the consequences of 
positional concerns for individuals’ social behavior (see, e.g., Kirchsteiger, 1994), and some 
field studies indicating the influence of relative income position on, for example, employer 
performance or employment decisions (see, e.g., Neumark and Postlewaite, 1998; Torgler et 
al., 2006).   
In order to fill this research void, this current international cross-sectional study uses 
the rich ISSP 1998 international dataset covering 26 countries and about 25'000 individuals, 
contributing to the social capital literature. First, (1) it analyzes the impact of relative income 
disadvantages on individual’s contribution to the creation of social capital in her country, 
controlling for absolute income. Second, (2) it employs eight different questions to measure 
social capital along three different dimensions: generalized trust, confidence in institutions, 
and norm compliance.  
The results indicate for two of three dimensions of social capital that positional 
concerns matter greatly for its formation: a disadvantage in individual relative income 
position is detrimental to her contribution to almost all forms of generalized and vertical trust 
(except for trust in religious organizations). However, the sense for the civic duty of norm 
compliance, measured by ‘being an honest tax payer’, appears not affected by positional 
concerns, while the civic duty of serving as ‘truthful witness’ is, again, negatively affected by 
it. We explain the irrelevance of any type of income for confidence in religious organizations 
by the specific nature of most religions to create a space freed from social comparisons.  
We also find that having a relative income advantage is equally detrimental to the 
generation of social capital – at least for four out of eight measures. This at first counter-
intuitive finding prevails when income distances are instrumented to account for possible 
reversed causality, and when absolute income is controlled for. We argue that a positive 
income distance may lead to feelings of fear of crime and retaliation behavior by those 
relatively worse-off, causing mistrust in one’s peers. Judged solely by their total elasticity, for 
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seven out of eight measures, quantitatively the positional concern effects dominate over the 
relative income advantage effects. 
Although our hypotheses were built on variants of deprivation theory, and were 
supported by our empirical analysis, in principle it would have been possible to make 
predictions in the opposite direction. Positional concerns might also lead to incentives to 
achieve a similar status, thereby inducing motivation and ambition (‘white envy’). Similarly, 
relative income disadvantages triggered by others advancing faster than oneself may yield 
positive feelings evoked by expectations of being on a rising income trajectory, the so-called 
‘tunnel effect’ or ‘information effect’ (Hirschman, 1973). A dominating information effect for 
relatively disadvantaged persons was identified by Senik (2008) for post-communist transition 
countries until 1997 and similarly by Alesina et al. (2004) for the U.S., while in Western 
Europe, the comparison effect appears to dominates the information effect (see also Senik, 
2004). Similarly, Bjørnskov et al. (2010) find that negative effects of income inequality for 
happiness are lowered in socially mobile countries, that are also perceived as such by the 
population. Given that most countries in the sample are institutionally well developed or even 
OECD countries, we speculate that the missing effects of positional concerns for ‘being a 
good tax payer’ and the negligible effects for trust in the economy are caused by upward 
economic mobility expectations.  
In general, for social trust the demonstrated capacity for positional concerns and 
positional advantages to destroy social capital nicely supports the existing empirical evidence 
in cross-country studies for the trust-lowering impact of income inequality, taking account of 
overall wealth effects (see Jordahl, 2007, for an overview). In this study, we can show that the 
effect at the aggregate level is not only driven by the destructive effects exerted by those 
individuals who are economically deprived, but also by those with a relative income 
advantage.   
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This paper presents analogous results of deleterious positional concern effects for 
confidence in parliaments, courts and the business sector. Happiness studies have revealed the 
relevance of the ‘rule of law’ in both developing and developed countries, which dominates 
the potentially beneficial effects of democratic decision-making (Bjørnskov, Dreher and 
Fischer, 2010). Given that the quality of the legal and court system and the confidence 
invested therein are in a perpetual feedback relation (with each functioning as the other’s 
transmission channel), our finding bears important policy implications, particularly for 
developing countries and emerging economies. 
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1
 In the ancient world, Aristotle (1924) treated envy in his Rhetoric. During the age of enlightenment, 
Immanuel Kant, in his 1785 Metaphysics of Morals, and Francis Bacon, in his 1625 Of Envy, discussed in 
detail the psychology of ingratitude and ‘Schadenfreude’, provided well-developed definitions of envy and 
emphasized the importance of social comparisons. Other, modern classical philosophers such as 
Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, or Nietzsche have also stressed the function of envy in human society.   
2
  This study includes one additional country, increasing the variation in national reference income. The 
analysis in Fischer and Torgler (2006a) is partly flawed in the way reference income and relative income 
are defined, causing a quite high correlation which partly hinders statistical identification.  
3
  See Becker (1974), Easterlin (1974), Scitovsky (1976), Schelling (1978), Pollak (1976), Boskin and 
Sheshinski (1978), Frank (1985), Akerlof and Yellen (1990). 
4
  For example, Stouffer (1949) has shown that the relatively rapid average promotion rate for the group as a 
whole tends to lead to frustration about individual promotion rates. 
5
 It can be argued that the effect might depend on the structure of the tax system, in particular on progression 
of the income tax schedule. A higher degree of progression may reduce the negative impact of a relative 
disadvantage, but also the positive effect of a relative advantage. In our model, country/region fixed effects 
will implicitly control for such an impact. 
6
  See Bjørnskov (2007) for a discussion of the various dimensions of social capital and their interrelations.  
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7
  According to the modified OECD equivalence scale, equivalent household income is obtained by dividing 
it through a specific correction factor that takes account of economies of scale in household production. 
This correction factor assigns the first adult in the household a weight of 100%, and every remaining adult 
a weight of 50%, while any child receives a weight of 30%. The income of a typical 2-parents-2-children 
household would then be corrected by dividing by 2.1 (= 1 + 0.5 + 2x0.3).  
8
 The empirical happiness literature has rather employed the mean income as benchmark income (e.g. Ferrer-
i-Carbonell, 2005; Dorn et al., 2007). In our sample, however, the average is often located around the 70th 
percentile of the income distribution, letting its role as comparison income appear unlikely Regional and 
national income is highly correlated (ρ = 0.96), and estimation with a regional comparison income yields 
qualitatively identical results. Using a similar specification, results for the regional and national 
(subsistence/median) income and a graphical representation of main income effects are reported in Fischer 
and Torgler (2006a, 2006b). 
9
  Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) conversion scales may be subject to measurement errors and lead to 
imprecise estimates.  
10
  The descriptive statistics are reported in Table A2. 
11
  The first uses bi-regional average income per year using the GSOEP, while the second employs average 
wages in the same profession for an observed cross-section of workers. 
12
  Taking the log avoids quasi-multicollinearity (correlation too high with the relative income variables). To 
account for non-linearities, we also include its squared term, while conducting a test on joint significance. 
As social capital should not be equated with utility, the functional form should be chosen as flexible as 
possible.  
13
  Partial correlation between two out of the 6 income variables controls for the whole set of individual-
level variables (in addition to the 4 remaining income variables, as in the full model presented in the 
Appendix).  
14
 Inclusion of fixed effects does not permit correction of within-group correlation through clustering at the 
aggregate level (Moulton, 1990).  
15
 Based on the previous empirical happiness literature, we consider a Pseudo R2 of about 0.06 as good (e.g. 
Frey and Stutzer, 2000). 
16
 In contrast, Dorn et al. (2007) assume asymmetry only with respect to the second derivative of the 
estimated happiness function, and a symmetric one with respect to its first.   
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17
  Although the Wald-test tests the null hypothesis that two (or more) coefficient estimates are jointly 
insignificant (H0: coeff(var1) = coeff(var2) = 0), we will henceforth term it ‘Wald-test of joint significance’ 
as often encountered in the empirical literature.  
18
 Causing reversed causality, engagement in social activities might be perceived as high productivity signal 
by the employer leading to higher wages. For example for an omitted third factor, optimistic persons might 
view their peers as more trustworthy, on the one hand, and be more financially successful, on the other. 
19
 All Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level. 
20
  Even though the coefficient estimate on absolute income is for its logarithmized form, the total elasticity 
pertains to equivalized absolute income in its original form. 
21
 Original question: “Generally speaking, would you say that people can be trusted or that you can’t be too 
careful in dealing with people?” Possible answers were “people can almost be trusted”, “people can usually 
be trusted”, “you usually can’t be too careful in dealing with people” or “you almost always can’t be too 
careful in dealing with people”.  
22
  The ISSP also includes a question whether people perceive themselves as being treated fairly by others. 
Preliminary empirical analyses revealed that this question is most likely not a measure of generalized trust, 
but approximates a different construct. Possibly, it constitutes rather a form of particularized trust rather 
than generalized trust.  
23
  Examples for a retaliating behavior are criminal activities: An envious person experiences an increase in her 
utility by destroying others’ assets, even if destruction comes at some costs (see Mui, 1995).  
24
 Original question: “How much confidence do you have in ….(1) parliament (2) business and industry (3) 
churches and religious organizations (4) courts and the legal system”. Possible answers were “complete 
confidence”, “a great deal of confidence”, “some confidence”, “very little confidence” or “no confidence at 
all”.  
25
 Original question: “Consider the situations listed below. Do you feel it is wrong or not wrong if…a taxpayer 
does not report all of [his/her] income in order to pay less income tax”. Possible answers were “not wrong”, 
“a bit wrong”, “wrong” and “seriously wrong”. 
26
 Original question: “Do you feel it is wrong or not wrong if a person gives the government incorrect 
information about [himself/herself] to get government benefits that [he/she] is not entitled to”. The range of 
possible answers is the same as in the preceding footnote. 
27
  For example, if funds for government subsidies are from the European Union or another international 
source , the benefit cheater does not feel as if she was cheating on her own peers.  
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28
 The questionnaire describes the following situation: “Suppose you were riding in a car driven by a close 
friend. You know he is going too fast. He hits a pedestrian. He asks you to tell the police that he was 
obeying the speed limit. Which statement comes closest to your belief about what your friend has a right to 
expect from you?”. Possible answers were “My friend has a DEFINITE right as a friend to expect me to 
testify that he was obeying the speed limit”, “My friend has SOME right as a friend to expect me to testify 
that he was obeying the speed limit” or “My friend has NO right as a friend to expect me to testify that he 
was obeying the speed limit”. 
29
  The tests of joint significance on all three income variable and their squared terms, however, do reject the 
null, suggesting that (non-interacted) relative and absolute income does matter to people’s social capital 
contribution.  
  
Tables  
 
 
Table 1: 
Generalized trust and Confidence in Institutions I  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Generalized 
trust Parliament Courts Business 
Abs. income (log) 0.192** 0.054 0.081* 0.195** 
 
[4.22] [1.43] [2.08] [4.86] 
Abs. income (log), squared 0.005** -0.003 0.002 -0.003 
 
[2.84] [1.80] [1.25] [1.93] 
Neg. income distance -0.307** -0.267* -0.307** -0.247* 
 
[2.67] [2.38] [2.77] [2.20] 
Neg. income distance, squared 0.618** 0.452** 0.448** 0.670** 
 
[3.81] [2.93] [2.95] [4.36] 
Pos. income distance -0.035* -0.026* -0.021 -0.027 
 
[2.04] [2.06] [1.57] [1.95] 
Pos. income distance, squared 0.00008 0.0002* 0.0002 0.0001 
 
[0.60] [2.36] [1.80] [1.21] 
Total elasticity abs. income (at mean) .3757 .1790 .1529 .5447 
Total elasticity neg. income distance (at mean) -.0345 -.0449 -.0543 -.0089 
Total elasticity pos. income distance (at mean) -.0330 -.0258 -.0184 -.0285 
Observations 25623 25018 25144 24579 
Pseudo R2 0.0751 0.0583 0.0596 0.0668 
Tests     
Wald test abs income 21.61** 6.25* 5.12 30.95** 
p-value 0.0000 0.0439 0.0773 0.0000 
Wald test neg. income distance 14.71** 8.90* 9.95** 19.63** 
p-value 0.0006 0.0117 0.0069 0.0001 
Wald test pos. income distance 21.10** 6.61* 3.71 39.34** 
p-value 0.0000 0.0368 0.1567 0.0000 
Notes: Ordered probit estimation with country fixed effects. (Total) elasticities are calculated at the sample mean 
for the highest category of the social capital variable, elasticities are for the non-logarithmized form of absolute 
income. ‘*’, ‘**’ denote significances at the 1-, and 5-percent levels, respectively. ‘Neg. income distance’ is 
defined as (ys – yis)/ ys, if yis < ys and 0 otherwise, and ‘pos. income distance’ as (yis – ys)/ ys if yis ≥ ys, and 0 
otherwise, with ys denoting the national median income. 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 2:  
 Confidence in Institutions II and Compliance with Social Norms 
 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Church Tax 
morale 
Benefit 
morale 
No 
wrongful  
testimony 
Abs. income (log) -0.021 0.035 0.144** -0.035 
 
[0.55] [0.89] [3.57] [0.59] 
Abs. income (log), squared -0.0001 0.005** 0.008** 0.006* 
 
[0.06] [2.85] [4.42] [2.35] 
Neg. income distance 0.029 -0.114 -0.156 0.135 
 
[0.26] [1.01] [1.33] [0.84] 
Neg. income distance, squared -0.004 0.088 0.197 -0.451* 
 
[0.03] [0.57] [1.22] [2.13] 
Pos. income distance -0.008 -0.021 -0.015 0.014 
 
[0.61] [1.53] [1.09] [0.75] 
Pos. income distance, squared 0.0001 0.0001 0.00006 0.0001 
 
[0.94] [1.53] [0.69] [0.82] 
Total elasticity abs. income (at mean) -.0396 .0026 .0713 -.0249 
Total elasticity neg. income distance (at mean) .0124 -.0175 -.0119 -.0073 
Total elasticity  pos. income distance (at mean) -.0059 -.0099 -.0047 .0002 
Observations 24919 25268 25532 22544 
Pseudo R2 0.1129 0.0399 0.0547 0.0743 
Tests     
Wald test abs income 0.31 8.23* 27.33** 8.01* 
p-value 0.8569 0.0163 0.0000 0.0182 
Wald test neg. income distance 0.10 1.04 1.98 5.12 
p-value 0.9492 0.5942 0.3717 0.0773 
Wald test pos. income distance 4.75 2.35 8.08* 0.89 
p-value 0.0931 0.3092 0.0176 0.6421 
Notes: See Table 1.  
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Table 3: 
Overview of Regression Results 
 
 Social Trust  Confidence in Institutions Compliance with social norms  
 Gen. trust Parliament Courts Business Church Tax morale Benefit morale No wrongful testimony  
Relative Income Position 
 
Neg. income 
distance - - - -    (+) 
Neg. income 
distance squared + + + +    - 
Pos. income 
distance - -  (-)   (-)  
Pos. income 
distance, squared (+) +  (+)   (+)  
Absolute Income  
 + (+) + +  (+) + (-)  
Model with Absolute Income Only 
 
Abs. income + (+) + + - + +   
Abs. Income, squared + (-) (+) (-)  + + +  
Notes: -, + indicate social capital diminishing / increasing influences, independently significant at least at the 5 or 1 percent level. (–), (+) denote influences that 
are only jointly significant according to the Wald-tests.  
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Table 4  
Instrumental Variables Regressions 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Gen. trust Parliament Courts Business Church Tax morale Benefit 
morale 
No wrongful 
testimony 
Neg. income distance -2.158* -1.059 0.786 0.261 -0.606 -0.054 0.098 -1.565* 
 
[2.36] [0.90] [0.62] [0.24] [0.48] [0.04] [0.10] [1.96] 
Neg. income distance, squared 4.328** 1.653 -1.569 0.851 -0.123 -3.262* -1.232 1.579 
 
[3.79] [1.18] [1.03] [0.65] [0.08] [2.19] [0.98] [1.71] 
Pos. income distance -0.319 -0.039 -0.248 -0.477 -0.032 0.271 -0.160 -0.030 
 
[1.61] [0.16] [0.93] [1.94] [0.11] [1.14] [0.72] [0.17] 
Pos. income distance, squared 0.006 -0.002 0.003 0.011 0.005 -0.006 0.002 0.004 
 
[1.17] [0.27] [0.52] [1.59] [0.68] [0.93] [0.29] [0.86] 
Simple model 
        
Neg. income distance -0.248 0.165 -0.624 -0.524 -1.330 -1.307* -0.853 -1.189** 
 [0.49] [0.25] [0.89] [0.87] [1.91] [2.02] [1.56] [2.60] 
Pos. income distance -0.109 -0.108 -0.114 -0.085 0.162* 0.068 -0.096 0.133* 
 [1.93] [1.52] [1.42] [1.34] [2.08] [1.00] [1.48] [2.35] 
Observations 15193 14981 15047 14826 14772 15076 15198 14172 
R2 0.140 0.150 0.140 0.110 0.250 0.070 0.060 0.040 
 
        
Notes: IV estimations with country fixed effects. Instruments are region fixed effects and a dichotomous measure of having supervisory power. **, * denote 
significances at the 1-, and 5-percent levels, respectively. ‘Neg. income distance’ is defined as (ys – yis)/ ys, if yis < ys and 0 otherwise, and ‘pos. income distance’ as (yis 
– ys)/ ys if yis ≥ ys, and 0 otherwise, with ys denoting the national median income. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1  
Description of Control Variables and Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Based on the VWS variables 
Main independent variables      
Individual equivalent income (yis) 0.47 0.96 0.00 11.00 OECD equivalized V216 
National median income (ys) 0.42 0.68 0.00 2.13 See above 
Abs. income (log) -3.12 2.97 -13.91 2.40 See above 
Abs. income (log) squared 18.58 29.79 0 193.47 See above 
neg. income distance 0.17 0.23 0 0.99 See above 
neg. income distance squared 0.08 0.15 0 0.97 See above 
pos. income distance 0.44 1.57 0 139.26 
See above 
pos. income distance squared 2.67 127.28 0 19393.27 See above 
Control variables      
Female 0.53 0.50 0 1 V200 
Age 30–39 0.22 0.41 0 1 V201 
Age 40–49 0.20 0.40 0 1 V201 
Age 50–59 0.16 0.37 0 1 V201 
Age 60–69 0.14 0.34 0 1 V201 
Age 70–79 0.08 0.27 0 1 V201 
Age >  80 years 0.02 0.12 0 1 V201 
Level of education 4.60 1.45 1 7 V205 
Level of education squared 23.23 13.46 1 49 V205 
Single 0.19 0.39 0 1 V202 
Separated or divorced 0.08 0.27 0 1 V202 
Widowed 0.09 0.28 0 1 V202 
attendance of religious services 2.36 2.05 1 9 V59 
Catholic 0.41 0.49 0 1 V217 
Jewish 0.03 0.17 0 1 V217 
Protestant 0.21 0.41 0 1 V217 
Orthodox 0.06 0.24 0 1 V217 
No denomination 0.23 0.42 0 1 V217 
Buddhist 0.01 0.12 0 1 V217 
Muslim 0.01 0.10 0 1 V217 
Urban 0.49 0.50 0 1 Community type variables  
Rural area 0.28 0.45 0 1 See above 
Self-employed 0.09 0.29 0 1 V206 
Unemployed 0.05 0.22 0 1 V206 
Retired 0.19 0.39 0 1 V206 
Housewife 0.10 0.30 0 1 V206 
Disabled 0.02 0.14 0 1 V206 
Out of labour force 0.01 0.10 0 1 V206 
Notes: This table is based on 25623 observations in the generalized trust regression (Table 1 column 2). 
Absolute income variables measured in 1000 PPP-adjusted international $.
  43
 
Table A2 
Description of Dependent Variables and Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Based on the VWS 
variables 
Generalized trust 25623 2.28 0.80 1 4 V19 
Confidence in parliament 25018 2.54 1.02 1 5 V20 
Confidence in courts 25144 2.86 1.09 1 5 V21 
Confidence in business 24579 2.72 0.95 1 5 V22 
Confidence in church 24919 2.92 1.20 1 5 V23 
Tax morale 25268 2.97 0.94 1 4 V16 
Benefit morale 25532 3.40 0.79 1 4 V17 
No wrongful testimony 22544 2.67 0.59 1 3 V63 
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Table A3 
Country Means for 8 dimensions of social capital 
Country Code Gen. Trust (count) 
Percent of  
total 
sample Gen. Trust Tax morale 
Gov.  
benefits 
No wrongful  
testimony 
Confidence in 
parliament 
Confidence in 
business 
Confidence in 
courts 
Confidence 
in 
church 
1 Germany 1890 5.80 2.31 2.67 3.23 2.66 2.38 2.77 2.87 2.50 
2 USA 1149 3.52 2.46 3.12 3.48 - 2.73 2.81 3.04 3.31 
3 AUT 954 2.93 2.47 2.48 3.37 2.73 2.70 3.30 2.96 2.74 
4 HUN 959 2.94 2.21 2.98 3.49 2.87 2.75 2.98 2.72 3.09 
5 ITA 941 2.89 1.96 2.99 3.41 2.70 2.21 2.35 2.65 3.02 
6 NL 1826 5.60 2.65 2.84 3.65 2.85 3.02 2.99 3.08 2.73 
7 NOR 1414 4.34 2.84 3.03 3.61 2.70 3.09 3.42 2.94 2.90 
8 SWE 992 3.04 2.69 3.19 3.67 2.81 2.64 3.09 2.93 2.62 
9 CZ 1093 3.35 2.44 3.06 3.35 2.76 1.99 2.19 2.30 2.37 
10 SLO 963 2.95 1.86 3.11 3.37 2.54 2.17 2.91 2.75 2.55 
11 PL 1032 3.17 2.07 3.01 3.17 2.57 2.28 2.76 2.55 3.29 
12 BUL 1014 3.11 1.97 3.21 3.42 2.58 1.99 2.03 2.09 2.59 
13 RUS 1409 4.32 1.97 2.32 2.90 2.39 2.10 2.26 2.01 3.04 
14 NZL 890 2.73 2.52 3.04 3.57 2.89 2.13 2.93 2.94 2.83 
15 CAN 664 2.04 2.50 3.08 3.64 2.82 2.43 2.71 2.88 2.87 
16 RPHIL 1096 3.36 2.12 2.95 3.00 2.31 3.38 3.40 3.31 3.92 
17 ISRL 1138 3.49 2.04 2.91 3.27 2.66 2.48 3.59 3.07 2.60 
18 JP 1068 3.28 2.22 3.39 3.61 2.54 2.02 3.12 2.46 2.09 
19 ESP 2215 6.79 2.26 3.34 3.57 2.70 2.74 2.55 2.91 2.92 
20 LTV 1073 3.29 1.99 2.61 2.93 2.38 2.09 2.49 2.43 3.07 
21 SK 1167 3.58 1.88 3.01 3.25 2.52 2.76 2.98 2.25 3.10 
22 FRA 1035 3.17 2.27 2.73 3.45 2.73 2.37 2.70 2.10 2.36 
23 PORT 1132 3.47 2.13 3.05 3.37 2.83 2.59 2.89 2.43 3.36 
24 RCH 1398 4.29 1.87 3.00 3.09 2.59 2.38 2.24 2.78 3.57 
25 DEN 1022 3.13 2.69 3.15 3.74 2.81 2.69 3.52 3.22 3.00 
26 CH 1111 3.41 2.63 2.75 3.57 2.83 2.92 3.11 2.70 2.92 
Notes: Country averages of the social capital variables based on the ‘generalized trust’ sample (Table 1 column 1).  
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Table A4: Determinants of generalized trust 
 Coeff. z-value elasticity 
Abs. income (log) 0.192** [4.22] 0.375 
Abs. income (log) squared 0.005** [2.84]  
neg. income distance 
-0.307** [2.67] -0.034 
neg. income distance squared 0.618** [3.81]  
pos. income distance -0.035* [2.04] -0.033 
pos. income distance squared 0.00008 [0.60]  
Female 0.011 [0.74] 0.204 
Age 30-39 0.032 [1.32] 0.013 
Age 40-49 0.102 [3.98] 0.016 
Age 50-59 0.059 [2.11] 0.045 
Age 60-69 0.056 [1.61] 0.021 
Age 70-79 0.036 [0.87] 0.017 
Age > 80 years 0.219 [3.02] 0.007 
Education level 2 -0.092 [1.30] -0.011 
Education level 3 -0.073 [1.12] -0.031 
Education level 4 0.042 [0.63] 0.018 
Education level 5 0.148 [2.21] 0.109 
Education level 6 0.262 [3.72] 0.054 
Education level 7 0.372 [5.36] 0.109 
Single 0.045 [2.07] 0.019 
Separated or divorced -0.104 [3.75] -0.018 
Widowed -0.024 [0.81] -0.004 
Church attendance 2 0.101 [4.11] 0.022 
Church attendance 3 0.122 [5.11] 0.031 
Church attendance 4 0.138 [5.23] 0.029 
Church attendance 5 0.271 [5.94] 0.020 
Church attendance 6 0.304 [5.97] 0.017 
Church attendance 7 0.147 [2.87] 0.007 
Church attendance 8 0.223 [4.80] 0.016 
Church attendance 9 0.153 [2.72] 0.006 
Catholic -0.013 [0.31] -0.012 
Jewish 0.002 [0.02] 0.0001 
Protestant 0.034 [0.82] 0.016 
Orthodox 0.089 [1.35] 0.012 
No denomination 0.033 [0.79] 0.017 
Buddhist -0.036 [0.48] -0.001 
Muslim 0.229 [2.41] 0.005 
Urban area -0.008 [0.39] -0.008 
Rural area 0.046 [2.18] 0.029 
Self-employed 0.023 [0.83] 0.005 
Unemployed -0.085 [2.36] -0.010 
Retired -0.016 [0.54] -0.006 
Housewife -0.028 [0.99] -0.006 
Disabled -0.156 [2.73] -0.007 
Out of labour force -0.033 [0.44] -0.008 
Observations 25623   
Pseudo R2 0.0751   
Wald-test (all religious denominations) 12.12   
p-value 0.096   
Notes: Ordered probit estimation with country fixed effects, respectively. ‘**’, ‘*’ denote significances at the 1 and 5 
percent levels, respectively 
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Table A5: 
Overview of Regression Results: Total marginal effects 
 Social Trust Confidence in Institutions Compliance with social norms 
 Gen. trust Parliament Courts Business Church Tax morale Benefit morale No wrongful testimony 
Absolute Income Relative Income Position: Negative 
25th percentile 
-0.0157 -0.0116 -0.0234 -0.0062 0.0035 -0.0404 -0.0618 0.0412 
Rel. income = 0 
-0.0220 -0.0141 -0.0273 -0.0108 0.0034 -0.0407 -0.0619 0.0444 
75th percentile - - - - - - - - 
 Relative Income Position: Positive 
25th percentile 
- - - - - - - - 
Rel. income = 0 
-0.0026 -0.0014 -0.0019 -0.0012 -0.0009 -0.0076 -0.0058 0.0047 
75th percentile -0.0036 -0.0016 -0.0021 -0.0020 -0.0009 -0.0074 -0.0057 0.0048 
 Absolute Income (in log-form) 
25th percentile 0.0177 -0.0019 0.0112 0.0024 -0.0030 0.0686 0.1603 0.0451 
Rel. income = 0 0.0744 0.0002 0.0102 0.0061 -0.0026 0.0429 0.1128 0.0203 
75th percentile 0.0223 0.0024 0.0092 0.0131 -0.0023 0.0212 0.0714 -0,0031 
Notes: Total marginal effects are calculated for the 25th and, the 75th percentiles of the log-income distribution and the log income for which both relative income positions are 
zero (for the average equalized income), and their specific corresponding relative income positions. All remaining covariates are evaluated at the social capital-specific regression 
sample means. 
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